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Introduction 
 
In the spring of 2009 the UK Ministry of Defence elected to undertake a review of the 
existing military Joint Intelligence Doctrine.  The existing doctrine, Joint Warfare 
Doctrine 2-00 (JWP 2-00) Intelligence Support to Joint Operations had been 
promulgated in 2003 largely on the basis of coalition-oriented expeditionary and 
peace support operations in the Balkans, Middle East and Afghanistan.  This had 
replaced an earlier, first edition of JWP 2-00 issued in 1999.  By 2009, the UK’s 
intelligence doctrine had escaped scrutiny for six years, two years longer than its 
predecessor and under conditions which had witnessed wide-ranging and accelerating 
changed in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) environment and 
longest interval of sustained, high tempo operations by UK forces since the Second 
World War.  Regardless of how sound a piece of work the 2003 doctrine might have 
been, too many goal posts had moved too far and there was a widespread and growing 
dissatisfaction with it. 
 
Given the often radical transformations to ISR and the conduct of operational and 
tactical intelligence in the decade since the first edition of JWP 2-00, the view was 
also taken that an equally radical approach needed to be taken in producing the new 
doctrine.  First the new doctrine would be compiled on the basis of widespread, cross-
government consultation on key issues and concepts rather than worked up narrowly 
in-house.  Second, that breadth of engagement was to be extended to include the 
comparatively recently established realm scholarly intelligence and security studies.  
Within the UK, the principal team working on conceptual and policy issues in 
intelligence in the university sector (as opposed to historical work which dominates 
the so-called ‘British school of intelligence studies’) was the Brunel Centre for 
Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) based at Brunel University in London.  
After an initial approach by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) 
followed by a preliminary, advisory memorandum on military intelligence doctrine 
produced by the BCISS team
1
 a three-way partnership was established between 
DCDC, Defence Intelligence
2
 and BCISS to develop the new doctrine which would 
go forward under the NATO- and US-compatible designation Joint Doctrine 
Publication 2-00. 
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There was range of running debates that the new doctrine would need to address.  
These included: how to incorporate human terrain analysis (HTA) and its embedded 
academic subject-matter experts effectively into a doctrine for the armed services (and 
discomfort with the term ‘terrain’ which seemed too ‘land-oriented’ to two of the 
three armed services); adjudicating a running and sometimes vituperative dispute over 
whether the prevalent term for operational and tactical intelligence should be the US 
and NATO-standard ISR or the prevalent term in British practice of intelligence, 
surveillance, target-acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR)
3
; articulating the 
increasing vertical overlap between national intelligence and ISR/ISTAR activities 
and products; and trying to locate military and defence intelligence in the fast-
changing national intelligence governance structures under the administrations of 
Gordon Brown and David Cameron.
4
    
 
No single matter of discussion was more earnestly disputed, or more completely 
divided supposedly ‘progressive’ critics of current practice from ‘old guard’ 
conservatives, than the status and prospects for the intelligence cycle.  Rethinking and 
revising the intelligence cycle rapidly became one of the central tasks for the JDP 2-
00 team.  What emerged, and eventually won comparatively widespread support, was 
an approach designated the ‘core functions of intelligence paradigm’.  The core 
functions approach was intended reckon with the substantive and often well-
considered concerns on both sides of the debate.  Ideally the new formula would be an 
emergent property of dealing with those concerns rather than taking one side or 
another or simply postulating a third alternative that neither side would want or accept. 
In the event, the ‘core functions of intelligence’ paradigm was adopted for the new 
intelligence doctrine.  As a result, the formula described herein is not a hypothetical 
proposal but in fact constitutes the accepted doctrinal standard for today’s British 
armed services, wider UK defence community and is currently being incorporated 
into the new NATO intelligence doctrine being produced as Allied Joint Publication 
2-00. 
 
Variations on a Theme 
 
At the outset it is important to keep in mind that there is some variation in the 
constituent components of what makes up the intelligence cycle.  One of the earliest 
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public references to the concept appears in the final report of the Church inquiry, 
subsequently used by numerous authors in which, in Walter Laqueur’s words: 
 
…the first stage in the intelligence cycle is an indication by [intelligence] 
consumers of the kind of information needed.  These needs are conveyed to 
senior intelligence officials, who in turn inform the collectors.  The collectors 
then obtain information, then ‘raw’ intelligence is turned into finished 
intelligence which is eventually supplied to consumers.
5
 
 
In US practice, however, at least since the 1990s, the cycle’s intermediate process 
between collection and dissemination has been broken out into two steps, ‘processing’ 
and ‘analysis’, the former referring chiefly to the interpretation of data generated by 
collection activities and systems the latter identifying its implications for wider 
judgements and contextual issues that the collected ‘raw’ intelligence is supposed to 
clarify.
6
  By much the same token, the relatively narrow notion of ‘tasking’ has been 
generally supplanted by the broader notion of ‘direction’ within which the laying of 
requirements and priorities is but one component part.  The resulting formula is often 
referred to as the DCPAD (deecee-pad) model. 
 
NATO, and consequently UK practice (which frequently takes NATO conventions as 
the point of departure for sovereign practice), has employed a somewhat simpler four 
step cycle of ‘direction-collection-processing-dissemination’ at least since the 1970s.  
In this formulation, processing subsumes both ‘processing’ and ‘analysis’ (figure 1).  
Slightly confusingly, the DCPD sequence also appears in British operational and 
tactical intelligence discourse as the ‘ISTAR chain’.7  What is consistent is the degree 
to which the UK’s defence intelligence community is committed to the DCPD 
convention.  Consequently all of the deliberation, and the subsequent formulation of 
the ‘core functions’ paradigm, was in terms of the NATO DCPD formulation. 
 
There reasons to suggest, however, that the five-step DCPAD model is a somewhat 
clearer expression of the process on the grounds that ‘analysis’ is a fundamentally 
different task from ‘processing’. There are, for example, are some indications that the 
four-step NATO formulation has been found somewhat limiting by some UK 
commentators.  For example, John Hughes-Wilson, a twenty year veteran of the 
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Intelligence Corps, prefers to employ a five-step scheme in which ‘collation’ and 
‘interpretation’ are distinct.8  Alternatively when drafting the first chapter of Lord 
Butler’s Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the late Peter 
Freeman drew a painstaking distinction between ‘analysis’ and ‘assessment’.  In this 
formulation, analysis is examining ‘the factual material inside the [raw] intelligence 
report … in its own right’, partly by placing the raw intelligence in a wider context 
but also as ‘the process required to convert complex technical evidence into 
descriptions of real-world objects or events’. 9   By contrast, assessment seeks to 
identify ‘patterns’ and ‘extend a picture’ by taking the available analysed information 
and forming net judgements about the conclusions it supports in toto, marshalling 
alternative interpretations against accumulations of reporting that may be mutually 
consistent or inconsistent.
10
  In Freeman’s sense, analysis identifies what intelligence 
reporting means and assessment seeks to establish what that reporting implies.  Such a 
distinction leans strongly in the direction of a DCPAD approach.    
 
Consequently, considerable thought was put to moving from DCPD to DCPAD by the 
JDP 2-00 team.  However, it was eventually concluded that trying to sell both 
DCPAD and the core functions paradigm in a single revision to the UK’ Joint 
Intelligence Doctrine would prove, in one participant’s words ‘a bridge too far’.  
Consequently it was decided to shelve the case for DCPAD at least until the next 
revision to JDP 2-00 in the second half of the decade. As should become apparent, 
however, the basic idea of the core functions paradigm is as applicable to DCPAD as 
to DCPD. 
 
Institutional Background: Intelligence Doctrine 
 
It is important, especially for a civilian readership, to understand what ‘doctrine’ is 
about and its role in military thought and practice.  Common operating standards, 
common concepts, and a common professional dialect are essential to a community 
that depends for its effectiveness for quick, clear and effective communication of 
information and instructions, and which has a high level of regular staff turn-over 
even in key staff positions.  Ambiguity and consequent confusion can have hazardous 
and potentially lethal ramifications that a conceptual difference in the civilian sector is 
unlikely to imply.  This is the practical context for the internal military discussion of 
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whether doctrine is ‘what is taught’ or ‘what is believed’, or as Lt. Gen. John Kiszely  
has put it, ‘what to think’ as opposed to ‘how to think’.11  As a common cognitive and 
communicative framework, doctrine will likely end up as the latter even if intended to 
be the former. An intelligence doctrine is, therefore, liable to hold a greater 
intellectual authority (literally and figuratively) with its subscribers than any 
‘intelligence theory’ that might be debated in the corridors of the Cabinet Office or 
Langley, Virginia.  Its users will also look to doctrine to mitigate and minimise 
uncertainty and nuance rather than resting upon them and then articulating them as 
‘issues’ or intellectual ‘problems’. 
 
This can also lead to another level of uncertainty about what doctrine ought to provide.  
If doctrine is expected to articulate common operating standards as well as common 
concepts then it is not a leap to expect it to articulate common operating procedures.  
Indeed, the British Army’s own Doctrine Primer is explicit about this, stating 
explicitly that ‘higher levels of doctrine establish the philosophy and principles 
underpinning the approach to military activity’ while ‘lower levels …describe 
practices and procedures for … practical application’.12  And, to a very real degree, 
single-service doctrine statements such as field manuals exist to do just that.  As a 
result, the earliest and hence most formative perception of doctrine amongst many 
service personnel is precisely as a guide to specific procedures and practices rather 
than anything more abstract.  
 
There exist, therefore, both a deeply indoctrinated expectation of procedural guidance 
from doctrine and a measure of uncertainty amongst many participants about the exact 
level hierarchy at which doctrine ought to conceptual instead.
13
  Consequently, 
throughout the production of JDP 2-00 perhaps the most fundamental difference 
between the ‘radicals’ and ‘old guard’ was whether the intelligence cycle was 
supposed to represent a series of standard operating procedures (SOPs) or a 
conceptual framework that might subsume many different specific SOP schemata 
under the auspices of an ambient rather than prescriptive logical structure.  As we 
shall see shortly, the distinction between what might be called the conceptualist and 
proceduralist views of the intelligence cycle infuses civilian discussion of the 
intelligence cycle as well.  But for the armed services, the need for procedural clarity 
has an urgency very different from that of any civilian enterprise and consequently the 
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dispute between conceptual and procedural concepts of the intelligence cycle likewise 
acquired an amplified sense of urgency and intensity of feeling amongst the disputants. 
 
That need for clarity and prescription has long prompted the chronic concern amongst 
doctrine writers that, in J.F.C. Fuller’s oft-quoted words, ‘the danger of a doctrine is 
that it is apt to ossify into dogma’.14  And herein lies the critical issue with which the 
JDP 2-00 team had to reckon, and of which the dispute between the conceptual and 
procedural ‘camps’ are essentially restatements.  Should the intelligence cycle 
articulate a descriptive account of ‘doing’ intelligence?  Or should it be a general 
conceptual expression of basic functions of which the numerous institutional 
frameworks, like RPSI or CCIRM (now confusingly IRM&CM) in the UK and KIQs, 
NITs, and ‘Needs’15 in the USA, are just specific cases and applications?  In the event, 
the view taken by the British military generally, and the JDP 2-00 team in particular,  
was that doctrine, and especially high-level joint doctrine, is about general principles 
and low-level doctrine and field manuals are about procedure.  With this in mind, the 
resulting approach was to dry and defuse the intelligence cycle debate by making the 
concept-procedure distinction as explicit as possible and dealing with each concern 
separately.  But to do so the JDP 2-00 team needed to reckon with a significant legacy 
of debate regarding the virtues or not of the intelligence cycle, a debate not confined 
to defence circles. 
 
Conceptual Background: the Intelligence Cycle Debate 
 
The value or otherwise of the intelligence cycle is a standard item in the literature of 
intelligence theory (in Peter Gill’s sense of ‘theory for intelligence’ rather than 
‘theory about intelligence’).16  One could write (and some have) entire articles on the 
debate, discussions that can resemble a sports commentator’s narrative of the back 
and forth between the disputants over the last two or three decades.  That being said, it 
is possible to distinguish much the same division between conceptualist and 
proceduralist approaches to the intelligence cycle in the civilian intelligence discourse.  
Unsurprisingly, the conceptual camp tends to be less trenchantly dissatisfied with the 
intelligence cycle than the procedural school although both sides have sought to 
clarify and improve the schema one way or another.  Indeed, one could even argue 
that we all employ the same four functions when we plan our own personal 
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research/investigation and reporting activities.  An academic ‘tasks’ himself or herself 
through a research plan, then ‘collects’ in the archives or through interviews, 
‘processes’ the documents and transcripts to understand his object of study and 
‘disseminates’ that understanding through writing and publication.  Sometimes a 
scholar farms out fieldwork of data processing to research assistants, but this does not 
alter the basic logic of the process. 
 
Michael Herman has famously described the intelligence cycle as being a ‘metaphor’ 
based on the classic cybernetic concept of a feedback loop.
17
  This is actually a very 
apt metaphor for the conceptual approach to the intelligence cycle, especially if one 
has actually done any software programming or built hardware sensor-actuator loops.  
In software terms, a feedback loop that appears as a straightforward drawing at the 
flow-charting stage can easily turn into hundreds or thousands of lines of intricately 
interwoven code.  Printed out and laid across a desk (or several desks), the finished 
programme bears little resemblance to the neat flow chart diagram pinned to the wall.  
Thus to look at commentators like Berkowitz and Goodman
18
, Loch K. Johnson
19
, Sir 
David Omand
20
 and, indeed, Herman they look at the cycle as an abstract statement of 
principles and then deliberate whether this is an accurate or appropriate representation 
of those principles.  Berkowitz and Goodman and Johnson both use it as a diagnostic 
tool to interrogate specific institutional arrangements and processes but not as a 
representation of those processes, while Omand and Herman rethink sequencing and 
basic premises.   
 
The procedural approach tries to correlate specific institutional entities into the steps 
of the intelligence cycle. The Church Committee allocated tasking to intelligence 
consumers with senior agency managers receiving those requirements and priorities 
before passing them on the working level collectors who would then pass what they 
collected on to specific cohorts of analysts and so forth. Senator Church’s team then 
became acutely exercised about the fact that ‘in reality this pattern is barely 
recognizable’.21  Rob Johnston22 has sought to ‘test’ whether the intelligence cycle 
describes what CIA analysts do at their desks and in their teams (unsurprisingly 
judging that it does not).  Likewise both Arthur Hulnick
23
 and Mark Lowenthal
24
 have 
elaborated in some detail how the simple framework of the intelligence cycle fails to 
describe actual processes on the ground in US national intelligence.  Given the 
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simplicity of the intelligence cycle formula, descriptive and procedural interpretations 
are naturally more likely to find substantial asymmetry between the neatly drawn 
flow-chart and the thousands of lines of entangled institutional ‘spaghetti code’.   
 
The kind of dissatisfaction felt in military quarters was been articulated by Geraint 
Evans, an officer in the UK’s Intelligence Corps, in Defence Studies in 2009, just as 
the JDP 2-00 re-write was in its infancy.  While acknowledging that the intelligence 
cycle is ‘composed of fundamental principles’ rather than specific institutional entities 
or groups, he also views the relationships between those ‘principles’ as rigidly 
prescriptive procedural steps ‘upon which the outcome of all ensuing action is 
determined’. 25  Although Evans acknowledges the conceptual nature of the 
intelligence cycle, his explicit goal appears to be to find a conceptual framework 
which can then be implemented explicitly, rigidly and in a manner that suggests 
(despite invoking Fuller’s warning about ossified doctrine26) a certain procedural 
dogmatism. 
 
Evans then argues that the intelligence cycle is currently under pressure to change as a 
result of a range of exogenous factors. The first problem the immediacy of consumer 
demands and consumer expectations with which a step-by-step implementation of the 
cycle cannot keep pace in practice.
27
  This is exacerbated by the information 
revolution in which intelligence consumers use intelligence differently
28
 (although he 
specifies no exact properties or examples of how that information use is ‘different’), 
intelligence staffs are confronted with increased risks of information overload because 
of the volume of data increasingly available
29
, and the availability of information does 
not conform to putatively ‘traditional military staff silos’ or chains of command.30   
 
Evans proposed solution is to expand the intelligence cycle into what he calls the ‘hub 
and spoke’ model.  In this formulation review, planning and direction are broken out 
into separate functions, collection remains unaltered, and processing, analysis and 
production are also broken out from the ‘P’ function and dissemination like collection 
stands unaltered.
31
  At the hub of this process would be the J2 cell in receipt of 
information from all of the various functional stages and conducting continuous and 
comprehensive review of the process.
32
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Evans acknowledges that the hub-and-spoke formula had already been ‘tested on 
exercises and operations’33 which is unsurprising because a version of the hub-and-
spoke formula had actually been formulated some four years earlier for the Cabinet 
Office by Stuart Jack.  Stuart Jack is a career Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
official who had, inter alia, headed the FCO Research and Analysis Department 
(RAD; the UK equivalent of the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research) in the late 
1990s.  In 2004-5 he was head of the Butler Study Team and had authored a paper 
entitled ‘Towards Better Analysis’, colloquially known as the Jack Report.  As part of 
this paper, Jack presented a version of the intelligence cycle which placed the analyst 
in the centre of a DCPD cycle, responsible not only for ‘processing’ but also taking a 
role in the ‘collection’ phase where raw data requires collating with other sources and 
even feeding into the tasking process to facilitate consumers’ understanding of what 
they can reasonably ask of intelligence (figure 2).
34
  In short, Evans’ J2 ‘hub’ is a 
military emulation of Jack’s central, facilitating analysts, and is therefore 
representative of a direction that wider intelligence thinking was already going in 
British government circles. 
 
The Core Functions Paradigm 
 
The initial case for the new doctrine explicitly adopting a conceptualist stance as a 
point of departure for addressing and taking on board proceduralist objections to the 
intelligence cycle was made in a BCISS memorandum to DCDC circulated in 
December 2009.
35
  A number of the key arguments developed in that memorandum 
were subsequently carried forward by DCDC and published in a 2010 Joint Doctrine 
Note, JDN 1/10 Intelligence and Understanding.
36
  Joint Doctrine Notes ‘do not 
represent a fully agreed or staffed position, but are raised in short order … to establish 
and disseminate current best practice’ and ‘provide the basis for further development 
and experimentation’.37  JDN 1/10 was explicitly intended to be a slightly contentious 
discussion piece, aimed at flushing out lines of dispute and uncertainty rather than 
trying to identify an easy consensus.  Described in its preface as ‘aspirational in 
nature’ and requiring ‘honest scrutiny appraisal and debate to ensure that it meets its 
purpose’, JDN 1/10 did just that and was hotly debated in a number of defence 
quarters. 
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JDN 1/10 made the case for the core functions paradigm through a series of 
preliminary steps.  The intelligence cycle, it was noted, ‘is (and always was) a 
heuristic concept that describes a set of logical inter-relationships between several 
types of classes of activity’ and therefore ‘cannot usefully be turned into a procedural 
clockwork that serves as a ‘quick win for busy analysts.’  Indeed, it was further 
argued, precisely when people tried to use the cycle as ‘procedural clockwork’ that 
the weaknesses of thinking of it as a mechanistic cycle were mostly like to be exposed.  
While a steady, regular cycle application of the basic activities of direction, collection, 
processing and dissemination might work for ‘long-standing problems’ where 
‘decisions are not required quickly’ or likely to take unexpected forms, such an 
approach lacked agility.  It was, therefore, ill-suited to the ‘contemporary or 
anticipated operating environments’.  While the four components of the intelligence 
cycle were essential activities, the ‘cycle’ or ‘process’ model ‘does not fully represent 
their role or functionality.’38   
 
It is important to appreciate that the goal was not to suggest that the ‘core functions’ 
did not or could not have the properties of a cycle under certain circumstances.  
Rather, the idea was that the core functions paradigm was more than a cycle, and that 
the traditional intelligence cycle could be subsumed by it.  Therefore, the next 
question was how to most usefully represent the ‘logical inter-relationships’ between 
direction, collection, processing and dissemination.  The Brunel team argued that 
what was required was an alternative topology, and that the most useful topological 
representation was as an all-channel network.  In practical terms, direction, collection, 
processing and dissemination continuously communicated back and forth and across 
the ‘cycle’ more like subroutines calling one another in computer software than the 
prevailing metaphor of electromechanical feedback system.  The resulting core 
function topology was originally represented in rough-and-ready graphical terms 
(figure 3)).
39
  It was in response to the new topology that one of the current authors 
(Rigden) in his role as head of the JDP 2-00 process coined the term ‘core functions 
of intelligence’ to replace the limited and evidently obsolescent notion of an 
intelligence ‘cycle’.  This was the topology presented to the UK’s defence intelligence 
community in JDN 1/10.
40
 An early promising omen for the core functions topology 
was a number of senior officials responding in various forms of words equivalent to 
‘that’s what I have been doing throughout my career’. 
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Under this formula, rather than steps in a sequence, the relationships between the 
various principal intelligence activities were best visualised as a network of dialogues 
and sometimes short-circuits across the DCPD framework.  Any two, three or even all 
four functions could be ‘wired together’ in different, often spontaneous ways.  Such 
cross-connections include: 
 
From Collection to Direction: The conventional feed-forward role of direction setting 
requirements and priorities for the collection process is generally viewed as 
straightforward, but the feedback and dialogue between the two is also essential.  
There are many situations where collection can and must ‘push’ information to the 
decision-makers to task it.  The collection process can often provide opportunities for 
collectors to detect activities that are of significance to or threaten the concerns of the 
consumer and which it may not have occurred to the decision-maker to include in 
their requirements and priorities.  Warning intelligence often takes this form.  Under 
these conditions there needs to be the opportunity for either for collection to short-
circuit the processing and dissemination phases to present the evidence to the decision 
maker or for the collector to initiate the processing and dissemination cycle on their 
own authority to ensure that the decision-maker receives a properly assessed product 
instead of raw reporting which may be misunderstood or taken out of context.  This 
also conforms to Michael Herman’s alternative to the intelligence cycle41 in which 
‘entrepreneurial’ intelligence collectors anticipate decision-maker needs and seize the 
initiative to push product to decision-makers.  Even the basic tasking relationship 
requires a real-time dialogue between consumer and collector concerning what can be 
acquired, at what risk, and what direct cost or indirect opportunity cost to other 
requirements.  If not, then requirements become an unrealistic wish-list and collectors 
overcome with tasks some of which must be allowed to lapse or none of which can be 
fulfilled effectively.
42
 
 
From Processing to Collection: Although typically the intelligence cycle represents 
tasking coming from the consumer and raw intelligence flowing to the analyst, the 
connection between analyst and collector is often reversed as the analyst has to reach 
back to the raw intelligence reporting to assist their assessment process.  Raw 
intelligence reports generally include what the collector thinks the analyst needs to 
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know from the source; however, processing the raw intelligence often throws up gaps, 
ambiguities, uncertainties and conflicts in the raw reporting.  In the first three cases, 
the analyst needs to reach back to the raw intelligence to clarify what has already been 
acquired but not necessarily circulated or recognized by the collector as in need of 
circulation, or to consult the raw intelligence in order to make a properly informed 
appreciation about what judgements can be made on the basis of the available 
intelligence.  Where there are conflicts between the raw reporting the analyst will 
need to mine down into the validation and evaluation of the original sources to decide 
how to weight the relative credibility of the sources.  By the same token, under such 
conditions the analyst may end up effectively driving and directing the collection 
phase, requiring collectors to go back to their sources to re-visit reporting already in 
hand or to re-task those sources to fill the gaps highlighted by the analyst.  
 
From Dissemination to Processing: Much as the analyst may need to reach back to 
the collector, so the drafter or briefer may need to mine down into the analytical 
judgements and reasoning undertaken in the possessing stage.  Often, of course, the 
analyst is also the person drafting the disseminated product where written reports are 
concerned but in verbal briefings the briefing officer may often be presenting a 
summary or amalgamation of finished materials received from other quarters.  Under 
these conditions, some degree of reach-back to the processing phase and the relevant 
personnel and/or institutions will be necessary.  It is also worth keeping in mind that 
consumer response to disseminated product will come back to the briefer in the first 
instance, and find its way to the analytical team via the dissemination team (as 
opposed to via revised direction and tasking as in the classic clockwork view of the 
intelligence cycle with feedback taking the form of revised requirements fed forward 
to the collectors and analysts). 
 
Between Dissemination and Collection:  Much as the analyst may often need to reach 
back into raw intelligence, the same may be true of the dissemination needing to 
consult with raw intelligence in order to aid the formulation and delivery of the 
finished intelligence product to the consumer.  In this case, there must be provision 
for reach-back from Dissemination to Collection as and when required.  By the same 
token, collection elements should ideally have a running brief to provide urgent 
current reporting to the processing and dissemination phases throughout the process.  
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Consequently, if a report received at the last is significant to presentation of a finished 
product to the consumer the collector must be in a position to forward that urgently 
and directly.  This could well be a direct Collection to Dissemination short-circuit by-
passing routine processing.  However, if the product were not completely self-
explanatory (such as technical product or a human source with significant attendant 
validation concerns attached), this might instead take the form of a three-point short-
circuit running from Collection to Processing to Dissemination. 
 
Between Processing and Direction:  The history of intelligence is replete with 
examples of consumers not merely passively receiving finished intelligence products 
but insisting on being able to reach back into the analytical process and the 
combination of reporting and judgements that prompted the appreciation presented to 
them.  It is also worth keeping in mind that in division-of-labour terms, the separation 
between dissemination and analysis often collapses when analysts double as drafters 
and briefers on the basis of their own work or that of their team.  Likewise, the 
distinction between direction and analysis can collapse where commanders factor 
interpreted raw intelligence into their operational decision-making instead of having it 
cycled through a separate assessment phase. A more widespread example here is 
probably the most common, and that most intelligence requirements are actually for 
fully assessed, finished intelligence.  Consequently in real terms, must collection 
tasking results from a three-cornered sequence running from Direction issuing 
requirements to Processing followed by analysts forwarding their information needs 
to Collection operators. 
 
From Direction to Dissemination to Processing to Collection: While it might seem 
counter-intuitive, the DCPD cycle can actually run backwards, and often does.  Much 
of the literature on the intelligence-producer/policy-maker relationship it replete with 
the actual feedback to finished intelligence taking the form of comments and 
directions from the consumer directly back to the disseminators/briefers.  The briefers 
in turn then take that feedback to the analysts (where they are not one and the same 
person or entity) asking for the gaps, questions and inadequacy expressed by the 
consumers be filled by the processing entity.  And the analysts themselves more often 
than not find themselves reaching back to the collectors to fill those gaps – and the 
collectors themselves may find themselves having to go back to the consumers 
DRAFT 
 
 14 
requesting clarification or further articulation of the requirements and priorities that 
started the whole process with which the consumer was so dissatisfied in the end. 
 
Ironically, the only real objections to the core functions paradigm as it was now 
taking shape were from the defenders of the traditional DCPD formula who could not 
locate the traditional cycle within the new model.  An alternative version was, 
therefore, presented which superimposed the traditional cycle on top of the new 
topology, not so much as an additional layer but as a kind of route map through the 
network (figure 4).
43
  Once the ‘latent’ traditional cycle was made explicit most of the 
resistance from members of the ‘old guard’ intelligence cycle traditionalists abated, 
apart from occasional grumbling about unnecessary extra complication. 
 
 
Venn Diagram of Functional Overlap 
 
There then followed a series of ‘thought experiments’ on how to represent the ‘core 
functions’ of intelligence. The first was an effort to represent the core functions in 
terms of a Venn diagram of their logical and functional relationships.  One of the 
chronic problems with the classic cycle formula has been the fuzzy boundaries of the 
various intelligence cycle stages, one of the reasons why there is such a wide 
assortment of intelligence cycles with slightly different constituent parts.  Is collection 
management a direction or collection function? Are imagery analysis and 
cryptanalysis collection, processing, analysis or what?  To make matters still more 
uncertain, although Freeman distinguishes between analysis and assessment as 
logically distinct tasks, he also asserts that ‘assessment may be conducted separately 
from analysis or as an almost parallel process in the mind of the analyst’.44  Given the 
fact that traditionally most assessments have taken the form of written reports given to 
consumers, is drafting an analytical or dissemination function?  This latter problem 
has been particularly brought to light by Sherman Kent’s classic problem of ‘words of 
estimative probability’.45  
 
The resulting diagram (figure 5)
46
 was not expected to appear in any final doctrine 
text.  It was, rather, aimed at helping the drafting team try to work out how to 
articulate processes and principles along the fuzzier boundaries of the DCPD 
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functions. It is worth acknowledging that the Venn diagram formulation helps 
understand the considerations underlying some of the more finely divided versions of 
the intelligence cycle such as Evans’ ‘hub and spoke’ model.  There is a significant 
number of functions that lie within the intersection sets between the main DCPD 
categories.  Any or all of these could quite reasonably be ‘broken out’ as separate 
functions along the traditional loop.  And that does give an additional insight into the 
resilience and longevity of the cycle despite its widespread popularity.  It offers 
simplicity and even elegance that more elaborate alternatives do not.  TheVenn 
diagram schema suggests that Evans’ outwardly reasonable formulation is actually the 
start of a slippery slope of breaking out distinct functions that would lead all too 
easily to intelligence cycle formulations of a dozen or more items or stages.  Indeed, 
one can imagine subdividing the marginal functions on the intersections between the 
basic four (or five) core functions even more finely.  Such an approach would likely 
introduce more confusion rather than less, and make the resulting schema more rigid 
and prescriptive rather than more flexible and adaptable. 
 
Nested Intelligence Cycles 
 
If the traditional, doctrinal intelligence cycle could be described as an 
oversimplification this could hardly be said of the doctrinal attempts to formulate 
collection management.  Most attempts to articulate the processes and procedures 
necessary to manage the tasking of collection activities and assets might be kindly 
described as plumber’s nightmares.  There was also the sense, in some quarters 
(typically from members of the ‘clockwork’ school) that there wasn’t a single 
intelligence cycle occurring in a single institutional locus but many others spinning 
away at multiple different levels in different locations.  Terms fielded for discussion 
on the working groups included a notion of ‘wheels within wheels’ and that 
intelligence exhibited a ‘fractal structure’ in which each phase of the intelligence 
process replicated the topological properties of the whole.  The question was how to 
articulate this much more subtle and fluid concept.  As something of a thought 
experiment, the BCISS team proposed the idea of ‘nested’ intelligence cycles, or more 
accurately, nested core functions. According to this formula, one could ‘break out’ a 
core functions process from within each individual DCPD element.  The resulting 
scheme (figure 6) was intended to help represent this approach. 
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DCPD within Collection 
 
The idea of nested DCPD functions is most readily illustrated in ‘Collection’ and 
‘Processing’ where the internal dynamics are most systematically examined and 
described.  Collection management, for example, can be seen in terms of its own 
DCPD cycle: 
 
a. Direction = Selecting and prioritising the available databases, 
platforms, sensor and sources for direction a particular target, or setting 
a human source with a particular matter to inquire into or report upon; 
b. Collection = Operating in the sense of actually deploying the 
platform/sensor or contacting the agent and exfiltration or retrieval of 
the resulting information or ‘raw’ intelligence; 
c. Processing = Interpretation  in the sense of validation, and, in 
Freeman’s sense, analysis of the generated raw intelligence (e.g. 
imagery analysis of imagery from a UAV or satellite; decryption, 
translation and interpretation of an intercept; or debriefing the agent to 
generate a  ‘contact note’47 HUMINT; 
d. Dissemination = Collating the raw intelligence with other reporting 
and background context to turn turning the imagery analysis, intercept 
data into SIGINT or contact notes from an agent meeting into a source 
report. 
 
It is easy to imagine the collection phase’s own subordinate cycle, such as in a 
HUMINT operation where ‘direction’ is formulating the plan to contact the agent; 
‘collection’ is the actual meet, clearing the letter drop or what have you; processing is 
generating the ‘contact notes’, processing secret writing to make it visible, and 
‘dissemination’ is the generation of the contact note or equivalent.  
 
DCPD within Processing 
 
In the same way, ‘Processing’ can be broken down for, for example, a JIC national 
assessment by the Assessments Staff as: 
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a. Direction = Identifying the requirement in question and target audience 
who have likely laid the requirement, the formulating the paper’s 
Terms of Reference (ToR); 
b. Collection = Requesting and receipt and collation of supporting papers 
in the form of intelligence reports (e.g. SIS CX reports)  and 
departmental views from other government departments such as DI, 
the FCO, Home Office and others. 
c. Processing = Collation of raw intelligence reports and departmental 
views, then forming an estimative judgement by weighing the evidence 
through traditional or structured analytical methodologies; then; 
d. Dissemination =  writing the Preliminary Draft; challenge and review 
by JIO Challenge team as well as at CIG(s) followed by revision to 
produce the Final paper (which is the forwarded for publication and 
distribution under the conventional ‘Dissemination’ phase one level 
up). 
 
Equivalent steps could as easily be identified within in any other finished intelligence 
production process in any other analytical unit, J2, single service intelligence element 
and throughout what is currently termed ‘the wider analytic community’. 
 
DCPD within Direction and Dissemination 
 
Much the same processes go on at the Direction level with the commander or 
decision-makers deciding what decisions need to be made and what information is 
needed to make that decision; conducting an audit of their existing knowledge base; 
effectively conducting a gap analysis of that information and then, on the basis of the 
gap analysis issuing Intelligence Requirements. 
 
And, likewise, in the classic Dissemination phase at, for example, the national the 
JIC’s Secretariat would maintain a schedule for reports to be produced (direction), 
receives the Final draft from the Assessment Staff (collection), proofs and typesets the 
paper (processing) and then actually print the reports and send them out to their 
readers (dissemination).
48
  The briefing officer preparing to present an Intelligence 
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Summary to his or her commander would follow similar steps (perhaps substituting 
working with PowerPoint for the desktop publishing work of their ‘processing’ phase), 
then actually presenting the information verbally to the commander. 
 
The implication the nested approach was, of course, that one could mine down still 
further, unpacking DCPD functions from with the ‘broken out’ from the basic 
framework, right down to the level of the individual officer at a desk asking 
themselves what do I need to know, finding that information, making sense of it 
individually, and then communicating at required to whomsoever might need it 
(potentially just themselves).  The goal was not some bewilderingly complex scheme 
of Copernican epicycles but, rather, to detach the DCPD heuristic from institutional 
and procedural specifics.   
 
A Higher Common Denominator 
 
With JDN 1/10 in circulation the notion of core functions paradigm, including the 
network topology, rapidly secured a viable level of consensus and cross-community 
‘buy in’.  The ‘nest intelligence cycle’ concept received a limited trial in the Study 
Draft of JDP 2-00 but was quickly abandoned as being far to abstract for doctrine 
writing purposes.  The principle remained, however, with the final version of JDP 2-
00 warning the reader that: 
 
While the intelligence cycle outwardly appears a simple process, in reality it is 
a complex set of activities. It is a continuous process comprising many cycles 
operating at different levels and speeds. Although the 4 individual tasks are 
discrete, as information flows and is processed and disseminated as 
intelligence, the tasks overlap and coincide so that they are often conducted 
concurrently, rather than sequentially.
49
 
 
The final visual representation of the core functions paradigm presented in JDP 2-00 
was essentially that the enhanced core functions topology given in figure 4, that is, 
with the ‘latent’, traditional intelligence cycle marked out separately and the newer 
core functions topology inscribed within the cycle.  The only notable alteration to the 
network topology was superimposition of the Jack Report’s continuous review 
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process over the horizontal and vertical cross-connections in the centre of the diagram 
(figure 7).  
 
On the whole JDP 2-00 3
rd
 Edition has been well-received across the defence 
community, the most common point of dissent being its length (arising chiefly from 
the number of relatively detailed ‘vignettes’ or illustrative examples).  It is not, of 
course, a perfect fix.  While the ‘core functions of intelligence’ paradigm effectively 
addresses most of the substantive dissatisfactions with the old intelligence cycle 
formula it has done so at the potential cost of being a much more abstract conceptual 
exercise.  The new doctrine is intentionally, one might even say pointedly, conceptual 
rather than procedural.  Indeed, it so much an exercise in abstract general principles 
that no need was seen to subject it to protective document marking and consequently 
it is the first British military intelligence doctrine to have been published unclassified.  
The need for both procedure and for a doctrine to speak to more sensitive methods 
and examples has not been negated.  Instead, specific and sensitive matters are being 
addressed in a series of sub-doctrine statements on matters like HUMINT, SIGINT, 
GEOINT and so forth
50
 many of which will be produced at higher levels of 
classification.    This formulation satisfied the ‘old guard’ intelligence cycle advocates 
while also meeting the concerns of ‘radical’ critics by making the difference between 
principle and practice explicit, and providing for separate articulation of procedural 
specifics at a different (and more appropriate) doctrinal level. 
 
Despite its acceptance across defence and favourable reception in most quarters there 
is a definite sense amongst those produced the new intelligence doctrine that it is very 
much an experiment in progress.  The case for DCPAD is still a strong one, and 
collection management remains a plumber’s nightmare.51  Doctrine is, as it were, 
always a moving target and whether or not the third iteration of the UK’s Joint 
Intelligence Doctrine is at least moving in the right direction will be a matter for close 
scrutiny the next round of comprehensive doctrine review in the second half of this 
decade. 
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Diagrams  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Traditional NATO DCPD Intelligence Cycle  
(Canadian B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Jack Report Intelligence Cycle (reprinted in JDP 2-00 3
rd
 Ed.) 
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Figure 3: the Original Core Functions Network Topology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Core Functions plus Latent Intelligence Cycle 
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Figure 5: Venn Diagram of Core Functions (revised) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Nested Intelligence Cycles 
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Figure 7: the Core Functions of Intelligence (JDP 2-00 3
rd
 Edition)
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